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???????????????????
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN POLICIES  
ON INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? 
????????????????????????
Introduction: over the last two decades, the European Commission radically altered its attitude 
towards investment arbitration and became its fierce opponent. This article considers the history 
of this change, attempts to fathom the pragmatic thinking of the European policy-makers, and consid-
ers its wisdom. 
Methods: the article analyses legal instruments that allowed the EU to implement the reform, 
????????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ??????????????? ??????????? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ???????? ???????? 
and considers their effect on investment in Europe. The authors make use of the historical and com-
parative legal methodology and occasionally rely on statistical data.
Analysis: the reasons behind the EU policies might have included the global backlash against the 
current system, the dissatisfaction with the Member States being targeted as respondents, the aspira-
tions to move the Union towards a more centralised federation, and possibly the populist motives. 
Results: having started with the intra-EU BITs, the EU authorities are now leading the way of the 
global reform of ISDS with the idea of permanent tribunals bearing a strong resemblance to the state 
judiciary. Many remain sceptical, and the initial economic effects were unfavourable. A surprising 
aspect was the role the CJEU had to play. It delivered a decisive blow to the existing system in align-
ment with the Commission’s policies, but without openly admitting the motives behind its decisions, 
and relying instead on the principle of autonomy of the EU law. 
Keywords: bilateral investment treaties, intra-EU investment arbitration, investor-state dispute 
resolution, arbitration, ICSID, Energy Charter Treaty, judicial politics, multilateral investment court
Introduction
?????? ???? ????? ????????????????? ??????????
investment treaty (BIT), investor-state arbitra-
tion as the legal mechanism safeguarding foreign 
investments has become a commonplace around 
???? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????? ???? ??????
the beginning of the twenty-first century, this ar-
bitral paradigm has dominated the thinking about 
the optimal form of dispute resolution between 
foreign investors and host states. European go- 
vernments confidently led the way in negotiating 
and concluding the new BITs, particularly with 
the countries outside Western Europe.
?????? ?????? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ????? ???-
??????? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????? ???????????
Germany-Greece and Germany-Portugal. Both 
agreements entered into force prior to Greece and 
Portugal becoming the EU Member States (1981 
???? ????? ??????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ???
such a state of affairs was that European inves-
tors obtained the guarantees of protection in de-
veloping countries, while European governments 
could feel relatively secure because the reverse 
flow of investments, from developing countries 
to Western Europe, was far less significant. Thus, 
the probability of becoming involved in invest-
ment arbitration for the developed states was low. 
In those early years, the European Commission 
welcomed and endorsed this form of European 
international relations [Nyombi and Mortimer 
?????????. 
??
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The situation started to change with the new 
????? ??? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ????-
tries such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Po-
land, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia joined the 
EU. All of a sudden, instead of merely two, there 
were more than one hundred and ninety BITs in 
force between the EU member states [Wehland 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
incided with another development on the world-
wide scale, namely that the investors and their 
lawyers finally seemed to realise the potential of 
arbitrating under the BITs, and the number of 
claims began to rise dramatically. With those two 
factors combined, Western European democra-
cies found themselves in a less enviable position. 
The global backlash against investor-state 
???????? ??????????? ???????? ??????? ????????????
by such events as Russia’s withdrawal from the 
Energy Charter Treaty and the exodus of de-
veloping states in Latin America (Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador) from the investment pro-
tection conventions and institutions in their en-
tirety came as a welcome opportunity from the 
European regulatory perspective. Having taken 
over the investment policy from national govern-
ments, the European Commission performed a 
one hundred and eighty degrees turn in its stance 
on investment arbitration and became its fierce 
and uncompromising opponent. This move began 
as a denial of investor-state arbitration within the 
EU on the basis of intra-EU BITs, but the Com-
mission’s aspirations extended beyond that and 
embraced any investor-state dispute resolution as 
far as it affected the EU and its Member States.
Against this background, the present article 
will trace and analyse the range of legal instru-
ments that allowed the EU to implement this 
change of direction over time, and consider the 
wisdom of this approach. It will undertake a 
humble attempt to fathom the pragmatic thin- 
king of the European policy-makers, examine the 
compliance of this move with the pre-existing 
legal instruments, in particular, the Washington 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????
(ECT), and consider its practical effects on in-
vestment in the European economies. It will also 
consider briefly the position in which the post-
Brexit Britain might find itself as a result of these 
European developments.
Materials and methods
The author used historical and comparative 
legal methods.
Results
The results of the research are expressed in 
the authors, conclusions.
Discussion
The current system and the ICSID conven-
tion. Investment arbitration, or the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system in its current 
form, is a procedure for dispute resolution bet- 
ween foreign investors and host states. It relies 
on an international treaty between two sovereign 
states (typically, a BIT or a Free Trade Agree-
ment), which provide private parties, the foreign 
investors, with a right to sue a host state directly 
in front of an arbitral tribunal that can resolve the 
dispute and render an enforceable award. Inves-
tors can invoke their right to initiate arbitration 
if they consider that the host state has infringed 
their substantive rights under the relevant treaty, 
such as the right to fair and equitable treatment 
or the guarantees against unlawful expropriation. 
Apart from the host state’s agreement to arbitrate 
which is given in advance by virtue of its sig- 
ning of the relevant treaty, many other procedural 
aspects of investment arbitration resemble closely 
those of (hitherto) better known commercial arbi-
tration – including the possibility of enforcing the 
??????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???
Investment Disputes between States and Natio- 
nals of other States (the Washington Convention 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
lying on the host states’ consent to arbitrate in 
BITs or other treaties (the Convention itself does 
not contain any provisions importing such a con-
sent), it established the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
laid out the provisions regulating the procedural 
??????????? ???????????????????????? ???????????? ????
Convention set forth the procedure for annulment 
of an investment arbitration decision. The list of 
grounds for annulment of an award is restrictive. 
The Convention does not stipulate the mecha-
nism of ISCID arbitration awards’ review on the 
??
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merits, and from the wording of the Convention, 
it follows that the awards are final and non-ap-
pealable. 
All the EU member states, with the excep-
tion of Poland, are also parties to the Washington 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
if an investment arbitration were to take place 
between the parties to ICSID Convention, even if 
they were both Member States of the EU, the re-
sulting award would be binding on the parties and 
not subject to any appeal or to any other remedy 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
reasons explored below, the European Commis-
sion found the system unsatisfactory and sought 
a way around it. 
A host of issues presented themselves when 
the EU authorities sought to influence the func-
???????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????
Several legal concepts came into play, including 
subject matter jurisdiction, ???????????? principle, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
One potential issue with the EU moving 
away from investor-state arbitration within the 
Union, with the ICSID Convention still in force, 
is that it might create uncertainty as to the proper 
forum for the protection of investor rights and, 
consequently, a new possibility for forum shop-
ping. Vagueness or incoherency of jurisdictional 
rules has the potential of leading to negative con-
sequences for all participants of legal disputes 
???????????????????
The cumulative result of the recent develop-
ments described in greater detail below is that 
the intra-EU investment arbitration, as far as 
the Commission is concerned, is no longer pos-
sible – neither under the BITs nor under any 
multilateral treaties such as the ECT. However, 
the ICSID tribunals continue to disagree and ren-
der awards in ‘intra-EU’ cases. For example, in 
???? ??????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????? ????? ??????
????????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ?????, case 
??????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ?????
Spain has violated the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard of the ECT, and awarded a com-
pensation of some €???????????????? ?????? ??? ????
investor incorporated in Luxembourg. In doing 
so, the tribunal has dismissed Spain’s objections 
concerning the intra-EU investment arbitration.
The following four sections will consider the 
various methods that the Commission used over 
time to implement its new policies on investment 
arbitration.
Early warnings and amicus curiae. The 
first time when the European Commission made 
an appearance in an investment arbitration case 
???? ????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ???????????
?????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????-
???? ????? ????? ?? ?????????? ????????? ???? ??-
????????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ?????? ???? ???-
mission’s letter to the Czech authorities. At that 
early stage, the Commission’s stance was rela-
tively moderate. It asserted the effective priority 
of the EU acquis over the inter-EU BITs and said 
that the prevalence of the EU law was automatic 
after the date of the Czech Republic’s accession 
to the EU. In Commission’s view, the application 
of intra-EU BITs could lead to the more favou- 
rable treatment of investors and investments bet- 
ween the parties covered by the BITs and thus 
discriminate against the other Member States. 
However, it also acknowledged that such prio- 
rity does not lead to automatic invalidity or the 
impossibility of applying the BIT. The Commis-
sion envisaged the need for the relevant Member 
States to terminate their BITs, indicating that such 
termination should not have a retroactive effect. 
Having considered this argument as part of the 
Respondent’s objections, the tribunal disagreed 
with the Commission and resolved the case on 
its merits. Thereafter, the Commission intervened 
as ??????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???? 
a few examples.
In 2011, in ????????? ????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????(PCA 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
ber 2012), the European Commission? intervened 
to submit its observations on the Intra-EU BIT 
issue. It argued that since the arbitration claims 
involved questions of application and interpreta-
tion of the law covered by the EU treaties, the 
tribunal had no legal authority to resolve the 
dispute between the parties. An arbitral tribunal 
cannot be classified as a court or tribunal of an 
EU Member State, and arbitrators have no right 
to request an opinion from the highest judicial 
body of the EU – the Court of Justice. The tribu-
nal rejected this objection, although it later held 
that it had no jurisdiction on other grounds.
Likewise, in its 2012 award, the ICSID tribu-
nal had to deal with a similar situation. In ????-
??
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????????????????????????????? ???????(ICSID case 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
sion to intervene as an ?????????????. The Com-
mission argued that the claims of the Belgian 
energy company could not be considered in inter-
national arbitration because the EU law governed 
the legal matters in dispute. The tribunal eventu-
ally disagreed with this interpretation.
??? ???? ????? ?????? ????? ?????? ???????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????
of Spain enacted legislative measures that pro- 
mised operators of solar energy units a reim-
bursement for the produced energy. Later, due to 
the crisis and tariff deficit, the governmental fi-
nancial donations stopped. The tribunal held that 
claimants were deprived of the right to fair and 
equitable treatment and awarded a compensation 
to them. Before the merits hearing, the European 
Commission intervened to submit an ?????????-
???? brief. Unsurprisingly, the Commission en-
dorsed the position of Spain. The Commission 
also sought to recover the costs of presenting its 
submission but the tribunal declined the request.
Thus, by following the ongoing arbitration 
proceedings for over a decade and intervening 
as ?????????????, the Commission demonstrated 
consistency of legal position but did not achieve 
any more tangible results. Something else was 
required to change the prevailing practice. How-
ever, it would be hasty to dismiss those efforts 
as fruitless. At the very least, one thing they ac-
complished was making sure that the arbitration 
community was very aware of the existing prob-
lem and the EU authorities’ stance on the matter. 
Enforcement of awards. The other form of 
influence the European Commission exerted on 
investment arbitration was resistance to the en-
forcement of arbitral awards. The New York Con-
???????? ????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ????????
for doing so, notably, the public policy defence 
(Art. V(2)(b)), the applicability of which may be 
open to debate in every individual case. Howe- 
ver, there are no such grounds in the Washington 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
Contracting State to recognise an award rendered 
pursuant to the Convention as binding and en-
force it in the same manner as a final judgment 
of a court in that State. Nevertheless, it turned 
out that there could still be a way to resist the 
enforcement.
In ??????? ??? ???????? at least six countries 
were involved in arbitration procedure and en-
forcement of the resulting arbitration award. The 
dispute arose after two Swedish nationals in-
vested in food manufacturing in Romania. Those 
investments were attributed to the incentives for 
the development of certain disadvantaged re-
gions, which resulted in tax exemptions. Later, 
all incentives were withdrawn and the inves-
tors started ICSID arbitration against Romania. 
On the tribunal’s request (???), the Commission 
intervened to provide an opinion as ??????? ??-
????, supporting the host government’s position. 
It argued that resolving the dispute in favour of 
the claimant would lead to a direct infringement 
of the EU law. ??????????? any kind of reimburse-
ment awarded to the claimant would contravene 
???? ?????????? ??? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ???
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
that declared any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources distorting or threa- 
tening to distort competition incompatible with 
the internal market. Once again, the tribunal re-
garded those objections with scepticism. 
The arbitrators rendered the award ordering 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????
European Commission adopted its own decision 
declaring the payment of the compensation to be 
a state aid incompatible with the European single 
market, and ordering Romania to refrain from pay-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Commission’s view, the Intra-EU BIT in question 
(between Sweden and Romania) was contrary to 
Union law, incompatible with provisions of the 
Treaties, and therefore invalid. For the same rea-
son, provisions of the ICSID convention did not 
apply to the present dispute. The Commission did 
not attach much significance to the fact that most 
of the events giving rise to the dispute in ?????? 
occurred before Romania’s accession to the EU. 
Remarkably, Romania itself expressed a prefe- 
?????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????????? ???? ???? ???-
mission was undeterred. Investors challenged the 
Commission’s findings in the General Court of 
the EU, the decision of which at the time of wri- 
ting is pending. In parallel, the award enforcement 
procedure commenced, involving at various sta- 
???? ???? ??????? ????????? ???????? ???? ???????
States, Belgium, Sweden and Luxembourg.
??
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The English High Court in ????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???-
peting obligations under the ICSID Convention 
and the EU legislation. The legal battle started 
with the court issuing a registration order for the 
award by virtue of Arbitration (International In-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
European Commission intervening, applied to 
set aside or stay this order. The court had to de-
????? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ????????? ???????????
to the present dispute. This Article provides that 
the provisions of the Treaties shall not affect the 
rights and obligations arising from agreements 
concluded before the date of the new Member 
States’ accession to the Union, between one or 
more Member States on the one hand, and one or 
more third countries on the other. 
?????????? ??????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ????????
??? ???? ????????????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???? 
????? ??? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????????? 
ICSID rules take priority over any EU provi-
sions, including the European Commission’s de-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Nevertheless, the High Court observed that, since 
the investors have challenged the Commission’s 
decision, the issue was pending before General 
Court of the EU, and thus the resolution of the 
dispute at this point could create a risk of incon-
sistent judgments. The registration of an award in 
itself did not infringe the EU law since it merely 
???????????? ?? ??????? ??????????? ??? ???? ????? ??-
ligations under the ICSID Convention. The pro-
cedure of award registration does not amount to 
its enforcement and the latter should comply with 
the EU legislation. If the Commission prohibited 
enforcement of a purely domestic English deci-
sion, it would be in exactly the same position. 
Therefore, a stay of enforcement, under those cir-
???????????????????? ??????? ???????????? ?????????
?????? ????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? 
EU enshrining the obligation of sincere coo- 
peration between the Member States and the 
??????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???? ?????
?????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??-
cession to the EU (and the respective obligation 
to uphold the previously adopted agreements) 
were not breached either. This conclusion fol-
lowed from the risk of noncompliance with the 
General Court’s decision and the different legal 
consequences of registration and execution of an 
award. However, the actual enforcement of the 
award could presently amount to a breach of the 
obligation of sincere cooperation. As to whether 
the Romania-Sweden BIT was valid, the court 
highlighted that it did not have an authority to 
consider this issue and the validly of the BIT 
might be a matter for the Court of Justice of the 
EU to decide.
Since the enforcement procedure in Europe 
has come to a halt, the investors and their lawyers 
turned their attention to the United States. The 
US Court for the District of Columbia declined 
the confirmation of an award on an ??? ????? 
basis, holding that a proper service on the foreign 
government under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act was required to enforce the ICSID award 
in the United States. However, the US Court for 
the Southern District of New York awarded the 
??? ????? affirmation. The defendant lodged an 
appeal to the US Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit, who vacated the decision of the District 
?????? ??? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ????
lower court’s conclusions did not conform to the 
rules established in ????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????
????????????????The Court of Appeal held that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provided a 
sole basis for jurisdiction over Romania, and the 
court lacked jurisdiction under its provisions. 
Thus, to a surprise of some in the international 
arbitration community, the EU authorities were 
able to stifle, at least for the time being, the en-
forcement of the ICSID award both within and 
outside the EU. It is possible that the whole ????
???? saga was the last straw after which the Com-
mission felt it had to resort to decisive action.
The judicial crusade against intra-EU bits. 
The landmark dispute that will define the near 
future of investment arbitration in the EU is ???-
????????????? ?????????? It involved a company 
from the Netherlands selling its insurance pro- 
ducts in Slovakia. Several years later, the Slovak 
government amended the national legislation on 
health insurance prohibiting the distribution of 
profits from the company’s business in the coun-
try. After the insurance company obtained com-
pensation in the Germany-seated UNCITRAL 
??
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arbitration, Slovakia challenged the award before 
the court in Frankfurt. The challenge was unsuc-
cessful at first, and the appeal went all the way to 
the German Federal Court of Justice. The latter, 
in turn, requested a ruling by the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) as to whether the BIT between 
the Netherlands and Slovakia was consistent with 
the EU law. 
In its 2018 decision, disagreeing with the 
opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, the CJEU 
declared that investment arbitration on the basis 
of intra-EU BITs was, quite simply, no longer 
possible. Since the investment arbitral tribunals 
take account of the domestic law and interna-
tional agreements of the respondent states, and 
the EU law forms part of those sets of rules, the 
tribunals may be required to interpret or apply 
the EU law. However, such interpretation and 
application is the domain reserved solely for the 
EU judicial systems, with the CJEU itself acting 
as its ultimate custodian. Within the meaning of 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
entitled to refer any preliminary questions to the 
CJEU. Therefore, according to the court, Art. 8 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
fect on the autonomy of EU law». 
If one reads this position literally, the conse-
quences of such finding are far-reaching and by 
no means limited to intra-EU BITs. Any other 
similar decision-maker, be it an arbitral tribu-
nal acting on the basis of a BIT with a country 
outside the EU or an international court of any 
kind, would have no mandate to apply or inter-
pret the EU law. The court did not specify what 
???????? ????? ??? ????????????? ??? ????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
the practical effects of an EU measure against the 
BIT standard easily passed muster.
It is also noteworthy that the CJEU high-
lighted a special status of investor-state arbitra-
tion, distinguishing it from commercial arbitra-
tion. The key difference, according to CJEU, was 
that commercial arbitration procedure relied on 
the disputing parties willingly submitting to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, whereas the investor-state 
arbitration arose out of an international treaty the 
effect of which was a re-allocation of domestic 
jurisdiction. The legal consequence of this kind 
of removal was the lack of adjudicative remedies 
which should be in place pursuant to the rules of 
Art. 19(1) of TFEU. 
???????will undoubtedly remain in history as 
one of the least popular CJEU decisions. To date, 
dozens if not hundreds of articles by academics 
and practitioners subjected the various aspects 
of the judgment to severe criticism. For a deci-
sion of such momentous impact, it was surpris-
ingly brief, radical, and inconsistent [Barbou des 
????????????????????????????????
The EU infringement proceedings and po-
litical pressure. The fourth form of the influence 
comprised the European Commission’s diplomat-
ic and legal pressure on the Member States out-
side any a specific dispute. Given that the BITs 
are a product of a diplomatic effort and a docu-
ment legally binding on the respective Member 
States, this may have been the most appropriate 
channel for communicating and enforcing the 
new policy. Also, unlike in the individual arbitral 
cases, this approach had the advantage of inves-
tors and lawyers specialising in investor-state dis-
pute resolution having no direct influence on the 
outcome. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
proceedings against Netherlands, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Austria, and Sweden requesting them to 
terminate the  BITs in force among them [Euro-
????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ???????
pointed out that the chief goal of BITs was the 
creation of incentives for foreign investment and 
improving the business investment environment, 
the Commission noted two crucial problems that 
intra-EU BITs create. First, they undermine the 
EU’s single market laws inasmuch as they over-
lap with them, being inherently incompatible. 
The second issue follows from the first one and 
lies in the fact that any pecuniary compensation 
that an arbitral tribunal may award is in its es-
sence nothing other than illegal state aid.
Those efforts – or perhaps the combination 
of all four kinds of efforts combined – promise 
to bring about the change that the Commission 
?????????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??-
mania terminated all of its intra-EU BITs on a 
unilateral basis. After much hesitation and delib-
eration among the other EU Member States, the 
breakthrough occurred in January 2019 when all 
28 of them signed declarations on the legal con-
??
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sequences of ?????? and on investment protec-
tion in the EU. In those declarations, the coun-
tries committed to terminate, bilaterally or pluri-
laterally, their intra-EU BITs by the end of 2019. 
Among them, 22 countries declared that ???????
was applicable not only to the BITs but also to 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Finland, Lu- 
xembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden noted 
that since the relevant matters were currently 
pending before the national courts, it would be 
inappropriate to express views on the compatibi- 
lity of the ECT with the EU law. Hungary was 
the only Member State to state expressly that, in 
its view, ??????? concerned only the intra-EU 
BITs and did not affect the ECT at all.
The energy charter treaty. The ECT was ne-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
in 1998. Thus, it was another relatively early 
example of an investment treaty, along with the 
BITs. Like the BITs, it provided for investor-state 
arbitration as the primary means of dealing with 
the foreign investor claims. The distinguishing 
factor was that, unlike the BITs, it was a multila- 
teral, widely accepted legal instrument promoting 
uniformity across the region. For our purposes, it 
is also important to note that the EU was express-
ly named among the parties of the ECT.  Thus, 
the EU has thereby assumed its own obligations 
under the investment protection regime and ac-
cepted investor-state arbitration as a tool for set-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Although so far the EU has not been involved 
in an investor-state arbitration pursuant to the 
rules of the ECT, one could argue that its fate 
should be different from that of the BITs, and it 
ought to be exempt from the ambit of ??????. 
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????
2018, the Commission rejected the possibility of 
????? ???????????????? ?????????? ???????????????? ????
ECT, if interpreted correctly as applied to the in-
tra-EU relations, is incompatible with the EU law 
and thus inapplicable.
The compliance of the ECT dispute resolu-
tion provisions with the EU law remains a divi- 
ding line between the Member States, as follows 
from their 2019 declarations, as well as between 
the European Commission and the ICSID tribu-
nals that continue to decline objections to their 
jurisdictions based on ??????. In addition to 
?????????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ??? ??????
mentioned above, another recent ICSID decision 
??? ??????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? (case number 
??????????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????? ????????????
deprived it of jurisdiction to hear a case based on 
an intra-EU claim under the ECT. As the tribu-
nal pointed out, while the latest positions of the 
CJEU might make the resulting award unenforce-
able within the EU, it would remain enforceable 
elsewhere. Thus, the divide between the ICSID 
and CJEU jurisprudence on this matter continues 
to increase.
Investment court: a way forward? Under 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the Member States have 
transferred their powers to regulate foreign di-
rect investment to the EU. Thus, the Union must 
now negotiate the new free trade agreements. In 
order to be viable, those agreements must envi- 
sage a legal protection mechanism as well as the 
enforcement procedures for investor-state dispute 
resolution. The new agenda of the Commission 
for investment disputes could be observed when 
the EU started to negotiate the new generation 
??? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ????????????
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment with Canada (CETA), the EU – Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement, etc.
CETA abandons the hitherto conventional ap-
proach of investor-state arbitration in favour of 
a permanent investment tribunal relying on the 
rules and doctrine akin to those of public judiciary 
in the Member States of the EU and in Canada. 
Following the conclusion of CETA negotiations, 
the Commission released the Recommendation 
for a Council Decision authorising the opening 
of negotiations for a Convention establishing a 
multilateral court for the settlement of investment 
disputes. It proposed that functions, structure and 
common aim of this judicial body could rely on 
the model of permanent investment tribunals es-
tablished by CETA for the EU-Canada relations 
???????????????????????
However, CETA rules themselves are open 
to criticism. The judges of first and appellate in-
stances are appointed by the CETA Joint Commit-
tee comprising the representatives of the contrac- 
ting parties, i. e. the governments. The investors, 
should a dispute with a host government arise, 
cannot select the persons who, from their point of 
??
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view, would be suitable candidates for the resolu-
tion of this particular dispute. One could argue 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
do not aim to provide a mechanism for the es-
tablishment of an impartial tribunal independent 
of both parties, and the principles of selection of 
the members of this permanent tribunal are quite 
???????????????????????????????????????
????? ????? ????????????????? ????? ???? ?????????
???? ????????? ???? ????????? ???? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ??
matter of fact». In doing so, the tribunal shall 
follow the prevailing interpretation given to the 
domestic law by the courts or authorities of that 
Party and any meaning given to domestic law by 
the tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts 
or the authorities of that Party. This article appa- 
rently sought to reinforce the principle whereby 
the CJEU has a monopoly in application and in-
terpretation of the EU  law and to preserve the 
autonomy of the EU legal system. However, that 
result could only be achieved if CETA made it 
mandatory for the permanent tribunal to request 
the CJEU’s determination of any issues related 
to the EU law – which it did not. Thus, follow-
ing the letter of ??????, a CETA tribunal is non-
compliant with the principle of autonomy of the 
EU law to the same extent as the investment arbi-
tral tribunals acting under the BITs.
Thus, from an investor’s perspective, an in-
vestment tribunal model of CETA is not neces-
sarily an attractive alternative to ICSID or UNCI-
TRAL investment tribunals. For the host gover- 
nments, it also does not represent an unequivo-
cally safe and desirable solution due to the possi-
bility of high monetary compensations that might 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????-
er to consider the Member States’ law and EU 
measures against standards promulgated by an 
international treaty. 
In European media, both CETA and the 
EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) had been portrayed as a legal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
sequently, the proposed model of investor-state 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
meren 2018]. Moreover, CETA’s rules were per-
?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????-
ism and protectionism» which is coming to the 
European continent [Lavranos 2018]. 
Nevertheless, in March 2018, the Council of 
the EU released negotiating directives for a Con-
vention establishing a multilateral court for the 
settlement of investment disputes, envisaging 
that the permanent tribunals under individual in-
vestment treaties could eventually be replaced by 
a single multilateral court. The model those re- 
commendations propose relies on the ideas ear-
lier expressed by the Commission in their criti-
cism of the existing investor-state dispute resolu-
tion system. 
??? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ?? ???????
opinion, ??????????, on the compatibility of the in-
vestment tribunal system in CETA with the prin-
ciple of autonomy of the EU law. The opinion of 
the Advocate General Bot of January 2019 found 
no infringement of the EU law, and this time the 
Court proceeded to fully heed his advice. In its 
???????? ????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ?????? ????
envisaged new ISDS system perfectly compatible 
with the EU legal order. 
??? ????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ???????????
sought to rectify some of the damage ???????
brought about. In particular, it has addressed in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a CETA tribunal jurisdiction might entail. The 
court emphasised the provisions of CETA stipu-
lating that ???????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???
??? ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ??? ????????
??????????? ??????????? ??????????????????? ?????
?????? ??? ?? ?????? ????? ???? ????????? ???? ????????
??? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ???????? ????????????
????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???? ???? ????????????? ???
???? ??????????? ????????? ???????????????. Indeed, 
such a public policy exception goes some way 
in distinguishing this new generation of invest-
ment treaties from its predecessors, in light of the 
experience with some of the more extreme ISDS 
cases of the recent years, such as ????????????? 
or ??????????.
However, the CJEU’s stance on the princi-
ple of autonomy of the EU law remained rather 
unconvincing. Explaining the distinction it saw 
between the current situation and that in ??????, 
the Court indicated that here, the agreement was 
between the Union and a non-Member State, 
rather than between the EU members. Given that 
???????suggested no possibility of such distinc-
tion, this argument does not appear very relevant, 
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except if understood as a hint to some further 
considerations on which the Court chose not to 
elaborate. Second, the CJEU opined that CETA 
tribunals would be unable to interpret and apply 
the EU law, unlike the arbitral tribunals under the 
BITs. This argument draws a distinction between 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? 
????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????? ??? ??? ????
from being clear that the arbitral tribunals ever 
treated the host States’ law as anything other than 
a matter of fact. Likewise, the Court emphasised 
that the CETA tribunals’ views of the EU law 
?????? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????-
less to say, the decisions of investment arbitrators 
never purported to bind the national courts in this 
manner, either. 
?????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ????? ????-
doned its previous orthodoxy as to the mea- 
ning of autonomy of the EU law and adopted a 
more nuanced position. However, it has done so 
without ever admitting that ???????was wrongly 
decided, distinguishing the current case on the 
grounds that did not quite fit together.?One can-
not help but feel that the CJEU has treated the 
all-important principle of autonomy as a mere 
weapon, a bogeyman that the Court could take 
out of a cupboard or hide again at will. In this 
case, CJEU apparently did not feel inclined to 
condemn the entire system of CETA tribunals. 
The actual reasons for the court’s dislike of in-
vestment arbitration and its favourable disposi-
tion towards permanent investment tribunals may 
have remained, once again, largely unarticulated.
In the meantime, the European Commission 
has submitted its proposals for the reform of 
ISDS to UNCITRAL, and as of 2019, the dis-
cussions about the creation of a new permanent 
court are underway. 
Achmea as a political decision. Given all the 
legitimate grounds for objection the CJEU’s rea-
soning supplied to its critics in ???????and did 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
left to wonder if there were perhaps some com-
pelling policy concerns that the Court meant to 
promote, but which it could not – or chose not 
to – explain in the text of its judgments. 
In fairness, the CJEU often comes under criti-
cism for the quality of its judgments – which, 
??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ??????? ???????????
often leaves much to be desired. This influen-
tial court is comprised of judges nominated by 
each Member State and appointed to six-year 
renewable terms. Although each judge is required 
to adjudicate in their personal capacity and not 
as a representative of their home state, the diver-
sity of their backgrounds and legal training often 
make it difficult to reach a compromise. Impor-
tantly, dissenting opinions are not allowed in the 
????? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????
on the panel must agree with the entire text of 
the judgment. Therefore, the court faces a chal-
lenge of writing decisions in a way that would 
satisfy all its members, often having to delete the 
controversial paragraphs from the initial draft or 
making them less direct. Those factors combined 
result in the CJEU decisions generally being brief 
and rather stilted.
However, one may doubt if this practical diffi-
culty is sufficient to explain ????????Looking for 
an alternative explanation, the notion of courts 
being political and furthering their own agendas 
while resolving individual cases will come as 
no surprise to any student of judicial decision- 
making. While this is acknowledged as an obvi-
ous fact in the US [Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman et 
?????????? ???????????????????? ????????????? ?????????
independence and separation of powers can make 
this tendency harder to admit.
As we have seen above, the European Com-
mission spent a long time developing its position 
on intra-EU arbitration. In addition, the Com-
mission has also been among the most ardent 
advocates of the ISDS reform generally, whether 
or not it concerned intra-EU investments. For 
instance, in its public consultation on ISDS in 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
in the subsequent communications – the Commis-
sion expressed its dissatisfaction with the current 
system and made proposals for a radical overhaul 
??????????????????
Indeed, along with the Commission, legal 
scholars have criticised investor-state arbitration 
on numerous occasions, and its opponents are 
advancing legitimate arguments. Comparing the 
legal status of judges and arbitrators in investor-
state disputes, several differences immediately 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
issue relates to their remuneration. While judges 
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earn their salary regardless of the duration of liti-
gation, the volume of evidence or the complexity 
of the dispute, the fees of investor-state arbitrators 
depend directly on those considerations. There-
fore, arbitrators have a monetary incentive to delay 
the procedure and make it more complex. 
Second, there is the problem of party-appoin- 
ted arbitrators. It is common for a tribunal to con-
sist of three arbitrators, two of them appointed by 
each party and the third chosen by the two arbi-
trators thus appointed. Under such arrangement, 
there is a risk that appointed arbitrators will feel 
as if they were representing solely the interests 
??? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???
??????????? ????????? ????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????
?????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????????
by means of an electronic system or another im-
partial mechanism, and any kind of interference 
with its operation is kept to a minimum. 
Third, being a judge is a full-time job, and 
judges cannot be involved in any other commer-
cial activity. Arbitrators routinely engage in mul-
tiple arbitration proceedings in different capaci-
ties (e. g. as counsel for States or investors) which 
judges cannot do. This may occasionally lead to 
a conflict of interests [Laird, Sabahi, Sourgens et 
???????????????
Fourth, decisions of investment tribunals are 
usually final and binding on parties [Bjorklund 
?????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ????????? ???
state courts are appealable on the merits. Judges 
can be liable to disciplinary proceedings in the 
event of flagrant violation of procedural or sub-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????-
lution of each particular dispute on a temporary 
basis, and disciplinary sanctions as such are una-
vailable in relation to them. 
Furthermore, a characteristic of investment 
arbitration distinguishing it from commercial ar-
bitration is that one of the parties is always the 
State. This underlines the critical importance of 
these cases because the stability of relations bet- 
ween the business community and governmental 
bodies is often at stake here. In the broadest sense, 
stability lies at the root of favourable investment 
climate and positive economic outcomes. One es-
sential factor that ensures stability is the unifor- 
mity of case law. Because of the confidentiality 
of arbitration and the absence of a single depo- 
siting system for awards, it is difficult to ascer-
tain the current legal position on any given issue. 
Besides, there is no obligation for the investment 
tribunals to follow the positions adopted by oth-
??? ???????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ????????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
make their judgments publicly available, and 
commercial parties may rely on them in similar 
cases – the extent of such reliance depending, of 
course, on the national legal system in question. 
Undoubtedly, proponents of investment arbi-
tration would challenge the validity of each criti-
cism above, often on solid grounds. It would go 
beyond the ambit of the current paper to express 
an opinion as to which side of the argument has 
a better claim to correctness. Instead, it seems 
more important for our present purposes to sug-
gest that considerations of this kind must have 
exerted influence on the minds of judges in ???-
????and could act as its better explanation than 
the principle of autonomy. Since none of those 
considerations was present in the CETA case, the 
Court may have felt more comfortable dismissing 
?????????????????????????????????????
Another consideration that the Commission 
emphasised most strongly, but on which the 
CJEU failed to elaborate in ???????? was the 
functioning of the EU internal market and the po-
tential for creating inequalities between investors 
from the different Member States. Indeed, if one 
were to imagine individual US states concluding 
investment treaties and granting additional privi-
leges to investors from some states but not the 
others, this would have been close to absurd – 
not to mention manifestly contrary to Art. I of 
the US Constitution. The EU has been described 
as something in between a federation and a con-
??????????? ??????????????? ??????????????? ????? ??
concern about having an exclusive privilege to 
regulate investment within the EU signals the EU 
authorities’ determination to continue the deve- 
lopment towards a true federation. 
Looking at the situation from yet another 
perspective, various commentators have drawn 
attention to a recent worldwide tendency of the 
rising nationalism and populism. For instance, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Brexit vote can be understood as the US and Bri- 
tish people’s rejection of globalization and a de-
??
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sire to consolidate the policies around national, 
domestic interests. Similar tendencies and sen-
timents have been observed in various regions 
around the world [Davoise, Burgstaller 2018].
Given the close connection between politics 
and large-scale foreign investment, the legal re- 
gulation of investor-state dispute resolution would 
be unlikely to stay exempt from these influences. 
One of the crucial arguments against investor-
state arbitration is its negative impact on the sov-
ereignty of States. The renegotiation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the evolving stance on energy disputes in Mexico 
both exemplify the growth of nationalistic ten-
dencies in this field [Rovinescu 2018].
Arguably, the policy of the European Com-
mission towards investment arbitration falls 
squarely into this populist pattern. This is regre- 
ttable, because the EU thereby further distances 
itself from the ideals of democratic inclusion, 
while also missing out on the opportunities for 
economic growth. If one were to interpret ???-
???? as implicitly incorporating those sorts of 
considerations as well, it would be doubly regre- 
ttable, because it would add activism, open sup-
port of the executive branch’s policies, and lack 
of transparency on such a crucial matter to the list 
of grounds for criticism, which is already long 
enough.
Economic effects of the policy. As shown 
above, the prospects for investment arbitration 
in Europe now appear rather gloomy. The model 
of a permanent judicial body dealing with invest-
ment disputes has a built-in bias in favour of the 
States rather than investors, and it remains to be 
seen how the investors will react to the new sys-
tem in the long term.
The position of the EU authorities, at least ini-
tially, did not seem to boost investor confidence. 
The recent outflow of foreign investments from 
Europe had weakened the EU economic system 
??????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????? ??????-
ment (FDI) transferred into the EU from coun-
?????? ???????? ???? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ???????? ??-
??????????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ????? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????-
time, there was a decrease in investments from 
Europe to overseas countries, which affected most 
of the EU Member States. The total investment 
????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????? 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
and financial crisis. This represents a decrease of 
???? ??????????? ??????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ?????
three countries (Austria, Germany, and Swe-
den) were able to increase their investment to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Eastern and Southern European countries, the 
ratio of investment to GDP went down (e. g. in 
??????? ???? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? 
????? ??? ??? ???????? ?? ????? ???? ????? ??????? ????
have been temporary, and, of course, there may 
have been other reasons responsible for bringing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The position of the UK. With its current de-
termination to leave the EU and all the political 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
faces unique opportunities as well as unique risks 
as far as the ISDS system is concerned. The tem-
porary investment outflow referred to above has 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
other EU Member States. For example, the In-
vestment Association statistics demonstrated that 
investors withdrew more than 9 billion pounds 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
the EU [Dew 2018].
??? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????????? ??? ???????
to reap some benefits after it exits the EU. If the 
???? ?????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ?? ????????? ???
will mean that the EU law would no longer ap-
ply in this country. This might, in turn, result in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
into Europe – close by and protected by the exis- 
ting BITs yet beyond the reach of ??????.
Under those conditions, it would be unlikely, 
for example, that the High Court’s stay of pro-
ceedings in ???????would remain in place, be-
cause it was predicated on the principle of sincere 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Union) which would cease to apply [Iordache 
2019]. In the long term though, such a position 
might have a detrimental impact on the willing-
ness of European governments to use the London 
financial industry where their sovereign funds 
would thereby become liable to the enforcement 
of arbitral awards by disgruntled investors.
??? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
2019 declarations on the legal consequences of 
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?????? and on investment protection in the 
EU, committing to terminate all of its BITs with 
the EU Member States. It Britain was to follow 
through on this commitment and still exit the EU 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
effectively marooned. They would have lost the 
conventional BIT protections, but remain unable 
to benefit from the envisaged new regime that 
the EU strives to put into place.
Conclusions
As the above discussion demonstrates, the EU 
policies on investor-state dispute resolution have 
changed quite dramatically over the last two de- 
cades. Having previously been an ardent sup-
porter of investor-state arbitration, the European 
Commission has turned into its fierce opponent. 
There undoubtedly had been a host of policy rea-
sons for this, from the concern about the effect 
that the current system may have on the EU and 
Member States’ ability to pursue legitimate pub-
lic policy objectives, to the rather less innocuous 
populist and nationalist aspirations. Having start-
ed with the intra-EU investment arbitration, the 
Commission did not stop there and is currently 
leading the way of the worldwide ISDS reform.
One rather surprising aspect of the saga was 
the apparent inability of the EU executive branch 
to effect the intra-EU reform solely by diploma- 
tic means. Eventually, it had to be the Court of 
Justice of the EU that dealt the decisive blow to 
the existing system. What is more, the Court has 
done so in perfect alignment with the Commis-
sion’s policy goals, but without ever admitting 
it and choosing instead to write at length about 
a rather vague principle of autonomy of the EU 
law. The Court was undeterred by the possible 
conflict of its findings with the Washington Con-
???????????????????????????????????????????
Finding out that the EU’s highest court feels 
that it appropriate to support the executive branch’s 
policy despite considerable opposition and without 
openly acknowledging it is in itself an amusing 
conclusion. Perhaps such a conclusion would not 
raise many brows in a developing country, but for 
the EU it does appear somewhat questionable. 
Having faced the initially negative reaction of 
the investor community, the onus is now on the 
EU to suggest a better legal framework. Much 
uncertainty as to the future of ISDS remains – but 
we might already be starting to see the outlines 
of the emerging new order.
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